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Planet Hallyuwood’s Political Vulnerabilities: Censuring the
Expression of Satire in The President's Last Bang (2005)*
Brian Yecies†
South Korea’s cinema has recently enjoyed a Golden Age that
has opened up new spaces for creative and cultural expression
in Korea and probably in the larger Asia-Pacific region.
Domestic market share of local films, lucrative pre-sales, a
robust screen quota and fresh genre-bending narratives and
styles have attracted admiration in Korea and abroad. However,
since its peak of success in late 2005 and early 2006, extreme
competition between domestic films, piracy and illegal
downloading, halving of the screen quota and the erosion of
ancillary markets have impacted on the industry’s ability to
sustain vitality and profitability. Among the challenges facing
the next decade of growth in the Asia-Pacific is ‘censorship’,
which was supposed to have been eliminated in Korea in 1996
by a change in government policy. A case study of Im Sangsoo’s The President's Last Bang (2005) illustrates how a
representative 386 Generation filmmaker has encountered and
resisted startling attempts to suppress freedom of expression. A
theoretical framework for exposing and opposing intimidation
in defamation and censorship struggles is applied to this case,
and the methods used by each side to attain their goals are
analyzed. It is hoped this analysis will stimulate a deeper
understanding of how Korea’s nascent national cinema engages
with sensitive social issues as part of its transformation from a
national to a supranational cinema, or what we might call
‘Planet Hallyuwood’ – the fusing of Hallyu (Korean Wave) and
Hollywood.
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Challenges for the Korean Cinema1
Censorship across parts of the Asia-Pacific region is impacting
significantly on creativity and the freedom of expression, primarily due
to the close scrutiny of scripts and the cutting of final prints by
government officials and by restrictive rating systems. In South Korea
(hereafter Korea) by law censorship is non-existent, however, different
ways of curtailing and criticizing freedom of expression have arisen in
place of official government regulation. This article analyzes a new
mode of ‘censureship’ dynamics, that is, the expression of disapproval,
criticism and blame for contributing something provocative to Korea’s
contemporary entertainment cinema. A case study of director/writer Im
Sang-soo’s 2005 so-called historical-fictitious film The President's Last
Bang is used to illustrate the methods that representative filmmakers
have used to overcome the oppression of creative and cultural
expression, which is one of the complexities shaping the cinematic
component of Hallyu or ‘Korean wave’ of popular culture spreading
throughout East Asia and beyond. A theoretical framework for
overcoming censorship struggles (Jansen and Martin 2003; Gray and
Martin 2006) is applied to the strong expression of disapproval
surrounding The President's Last Bang, and the methods used by each of
the players in this case and how they obtained their goals are analyzed
on the basis of published accounts. Despite all its glory, the Korean
Cinema has experienced a dark side that continues to brew in the post2006 downturn. The startling legal reprimanding of The President's Last
Bang points to one of the significant burdens confronting not only the
Korean cinema but also cinemas across the Asia-Pacific as they
transform and look for new collaborations between diverse cultures and
1

An earlier and shorter version of this article was presented at the 5th Korean
Studies Association of Australasia (KSAA) Biennial Conference held at Curtin
University of Technology, Perth, Australia, 12–13 July 2007. The author thanks
colleagues and friends Brian Martin, Kim Hyae-joon, Mark Russell and AeGyung Shim as well as the anonymous referees for their helpful comments. A
Korea Foundation Advanced Research Grant enabled valuable industry and
archive research to be conducted for this study.
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regulatory environments. 2 Not only is it likely that this article could
open up a large can of worms, but also it is hoped it might stimulate
discussion about Korean filmmakers in the post-Golden Age testing
uncharted waters in their search for the next decade of growth.
The history of national cinemas in the Asia-Pacific region is
plagued with gaping holes, and Korea’s cinematic history is not without
exception. Recent studies and edited collections such as Lee and Choe
(1998), Lee (2000), James and Kim (2002), Kim (2002), Min, Joo and
Kwak (2003), Kim (2004), McHugh and Abelmann (2005), Shin and
Stringer (2005), Yi (2005), Yecies (2005), Jin (2006), Kim and An
(2006), Yecies (2007) and Gateward (2007) provide new understandings
of the little-known history of one of the hottest pan-Asian cinemas: the
so-called New Korean Cinema. What binds these groundbreaking
studies together is their contribution to the larger synthesis of what we
might call ‘Planet Hallyuwood’ – the fusing of Hallyu and Hollywood.3
The Korean cinema has become a ‘full service cinema’, which embraces
‘a full range of modes of production and consumption’ (Berry 2002: 1).
Apart from its lion’s share of the domestic exhibition market and fresh
genre experimentation and narrative styles, the global recognition of the
2

Co-production treaties serve as one of the key means of engaging with other
countries and facilitating transnational cultural flows. As of September 2008,
New Zealand had co-production agreements with Australia, Britain, Canada,
France, Italy, Singapore, Germany, Ireland, Spain and Korea. Australia has coproduction arrangements with Britain, Canada, Germany, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Singapore and China, as well as memorandums of understanding with France
and New Zealand (with negotiations underway with South Africa). Korea has
co-production treaties with France in addition to New Zealand, but coproductions need not go through treaties to apply for government and semigovernment (Korean Film Council, KOFIC) support programs and investment
funds. In China, treaty negotiations are underway with France, which if
successful will enable French filmmakers to gain never-before-seen access to
the Chinese market. Upon completion, this will be China's fourth international
co-production treaty along with Canada, Italy and Australia.
3
Since early 2000, Hallyu – an intensive and extensive wave of popular culture
– has been thrilling non-Korean fans and critics alike in Japan, China and
Southeast Asia, as well as parts of the Middle East, Europe, and North and
Latin America.
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Korean cinema has focused on excellence in proactive film policy.
Combined, these variables have helped filmmakers to breathe a
universality into their narratives and characters while maintaining a
distinct Korean sentiment. New spaces for freedom of expression have
undoubtedly helped filmmakers achieve this aim. Yet, many important
studies overlook the long-term impact censorship has had on the shaping
of these spaces, let alone the creative hurdles filmmakers continue to
face.

Censorship Struggles in the 1990s
Government and industry regulations as well as self-censorship efforts
and the personal views of censorship and ratings board members make
‘freedom of expression’ a slippery and complex term. In addition,
economics and conventional business models in the pursuit of profits
also shape the formation of content – particularly by those who control
the investments behind content production. Essentially, freedom of
expression exists in shades and nuances defined by changing social
norms, ideals, attitudes and beliefs, and differing – often competing –
cultural perspectives around the world. Simply put, it is the autonomy to
convey ideas and opinions no matter which medium is used, often
resulting in the questioning of dominant ideologies and power structures.
Throughout history, those who have challenged preconceived
understandings of controversial topics such as obscenity (pornography),
profanity, religion, violence and expressed critical views of governments
and authority figures often have been fined, jailed, persecuted (banned
from making films) or even killed for upsetting these arbitrarily
established views. In film industries where heavy government
interference exists, freedom of expression primarily has been limited by
the censoring of scripts and final prints – particularly in regards to
representing nudity, to glorifying violence and to critiquing the
government and/or society (in which case would make the government
look bad). In the case of Korea, recent censorship cases have been used
as a tool to challenge regulatory conventions as well as to generate
exploitative attention by particular filmmakers.
Within the recent historical context of censorship in Korea, the
year 1996 is a watershed year, a year when the Constitutional Court
ruled (on 4 October 1996) that pre-censorship regulations enacted by the
Performance Ethics Board (a.k.a. the Korean Performing Arts Promotion
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Committee, KPAPC) under the Film Promotion Law were
unconstitutional. The Performance Ethics Board’s so-called
‘deliberation’ system, which had exercised a heavy hand over
storytelling since 1984 (under Motion Picture Law revisions), no longer
had any power to restrict freedom of expression. In its place, the
government initiated a rating system that provided a greater range of
classification possibilities. Suddenly, the low-hanging ceiling that had
been restricting creativity exploded, providing the impetus for both
arthouse and commercial filmmakers to turn enthusiastically toward
fresh ideas. It is precisely this moment that most scholars attribute to the
fundamental beginnings of the Korean cinema’s latest Golden Age. 4
Within a relatively short period of time, a brood of talented filmmakers
and writers began drawing local, regional and international attention to a
host of new cinematic possibilities, which prior to 1996 under the
Motion Picture Law had been stifled.5
Since 1996, in spite of the nullification of so-called censorship
laws, a residual form of censorship has continued under the rubric of the
ratings classification system. In 1998, both Jang Sun-woo's Bad Movie
and Im Sang-soo's Girls' Night Out were self-censored (re-edited) under
compulsion by threat by the Performance Ethics Board. Then in 1999,
4

The Korean cinema’s earliest ‘Golden Age’ dates back to the mid-to-late
1920s when a ‘boom’ in silent filmmaking occurred during the Japanese
colonial period (1910-1945). A second Golden Age appears to have occurred
during the 1960s when an abundance of tear-jerking melodrama genre films
was produced to meet government-urged industry quotas. Producers who
successfully met these quotas received lucrative licenses from the government
to import select Hollywood films. Its most recent Golden Age can be said to
have begun in 1996 with the lifting of government regulations and a subsequent
explosion of creativity.
5
Prior to 1996, the Motion Picture Law, which took effect in 1962 under the
Park Chung-hee dictatorship, required all filmmakers to obtain script (preproduction) approval from the Ministry of Public Information (hereafter MPI)
and to give the government the right to the ‘final cut’ on completed films. All
filmmakers also had to register with the government, and every film, whether
domestic or foreign, required government permission to leave or enter the
country. Park’s regime as well the military governments that came after
ultimately used the Motion Picture Law, that is, outright censorship, to nurture
films that proselytized anti-communist ideology. Ironically, erotic ‘hostess’
genre films became popular (and widely tolerated by the government) while
narratives that criticized the government’s anti-communist ideology (and the
government) were forbidden.
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the film Yellow Hair received a three-month rating suspension – the first
of its kind after the Media Ratings Board was established and the rating
system was implemented (in mid 1999) – for containing a ménage à
trios scene. During the ‘rating-pending’ period, that is, after the Media
Ratings Board refused to rate the film – effectively making a domestic
release impossible – the film’s producer was forced to delete
controversial scenes and then re-apply for a new rating, which became
18 plus. In the following year, the Media Ratings Board refused twice to
rate a different film called Yellow Flower, which portrayed explicit,
strange sex acts (in the tradition of Nagisa Oshima's In the Realm of the
Senses (1976) and Murakami's Tokyo Decadence (1992)). The film’s
producer Gwak Young-soo from Indiestory took the case to the Seoul
Administrative Court and then the Korean Constitutional Court, which
eventually found the Media Ratings Board guilty of violating freedom of
expression. Whether circuitously or not, the aforementioned filmmakers
bravely began laying stepping-stones for the greater freedom of
expression.6
The next film to be rejected outright by the Media Ratings
Board was Jang Sun-woo’s Lies (2000), which is Korea’s third film ever
to be invited to compete in the Venice International Film Festival. This
case stands apart from the pack because it is one of the first instances in
which a filmmaker strategically set out to challenge directly the Board’s
authority and to maximize media attention for the film and its
controversialism. Given that Jang Jeong-il’s banned novel Tell Me a Lie
involved the sexual escapades between a high school student and a 38year old artist – sending writer Jang Jeong-il to jail – director Jang
cleverly used the filmed version to cause a sensation. Only days before
Venice, the Media Ratings Board refused to rate Lies, thus making it
impossible for it to be distributed in Korea. Around the same time, the
Association of Citizens Against Media Encouraging Obscenity and
Violence lashed out against Jang Sun-woo and his producer Shin Chul.
Finally, after multiple and lengthy suspensions by the Media Ratings
Board, the filmmakers conceded to the hiding of private parts, but
refused to change key elements in the script. A few other films such as
Too Young To Die (2002), portraying a seventy-something year old
6

Thanks in part to the efforts of these particular filmmakers, internationallyacclaimed films such as Ang Lee’s Lust and Caution (2007), which contains
explicit sexual-acrobatic lovemaking scenes, could be exhibited (and sold) in
Korea without being cut.
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couple having sex, have experienced similar censorship challenges and
has also benefited from an ensuing media campaign.7 The timing of Lies
and Too Young To Die represents a type of advanced maturity in artistic
freedom of expression.
The aforementioned cases, along with a batch of foreign films
such as Shortbus (2006), Battle In Heaven (2005), Kill Bill Vol. 1 (2003),
Wayward Cloud (2005), Eyes Wide Shut (1999), Happy Together (1997)
and Tokyo Decadence (1992) have aroused deep questions about film
censorship in Korea and its relationship to the portrayal of ‘obscene’ and
violent content in public as well as the status of films receiving ‘limited
screening’ or delayed ratings.8 Combined, their experiences before the
Media Ratings Board have generated a particular kind of energy aimed
at changing the disapproving attitudes and perceptions of this particular
aspect of freedom of expression.9 Yet, unlike in the above cases, few
other filmmakers and producers in the Korean Cinema’s post-1996 era
have had to fight so hard against litigation directed at the political
gagging of a story as Im Sang-soo.

7

According to Darcy Paquet (2002), the first known occurrence of a film
attracting a restricted rating is the nearly five-hour North Korean television
documentary called Animal Copulation (1987), which portrays animal sex
organs.
8
Battle in Heaven (imported by World Cinema) is an interesting and
particularly important case because it is one of the films that successfully used
the Korean court system to get the vague standards behind the ‘limited
screening’ rating from the Media Ratings Board deemed as unconstitutional.
Before the appeal to the Seoul Administration Court and then the Constitutional
Court, the film, which contained exposed private parts, was restricted to being
shown at limited cinemas, and nearly all advertisement and DVD releases were
banned. However, a lack of appropriate screening venues to service films with
this type of rating effectively resulted in the prohibition of said films, thus
making Ratings Board decisions of this type unconstitutional in the Court’s
view.
9
Changes made to a number of domestic and foreign film posters such as Bad
Guy (2001), The Game of Their Lives (2002), 3-Iron (2004), The Grudge (2004),
Everybody Has Secrets (2004), Lady Chatterley (2006), Share Living and Joy
(2007), Never Forever (2007) and The Cut (2007) – that is the toning down of
their sexually provocative/suggestive images and words (including in some
cases representations of North Korea and horrific ghosts) – have also
contributed to the larger but under-discussed debate about censorship.
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Censorship Tactics
Apart from studies on wars, military operations and business dealings,
rarely does one encounter analyses of tactics and backfire strategies used
by members of national film industries to achieve a set of goals.
Valuable studies on film censorship such as Butters (2007), Robb (2004),
Lewis (2000), Petrie (1997), Couvares (1996), Jacobs (1991) Robertson
(1989), Gardner (1987) and Randall (1970) abound. However, there is a
dearth of attention given to the specific methods that filmmakers use for
exposing and opposing intimidation in defamation and censorship
struggles across World cinemas. The Korean cinema provides a fertile
source of such cases because of its long history of massive censorship,
which needs sustained discussion elsewhere.
The President's Last Bang (2005) is the main focus in the
remainder of this study because from the start the script promised to
become one of Korea’s most controversial commercial entertainment
feature films. Posters for the English-language market appear below in
Figure 1. First, there is the subject matter that broached the topic of Park
Chung-hee’s death in a critical yet black-comic way. Second, is the
provocative reputation surrounding Im and his methods for getting the
film made in the first instance. Third, are the reputations surrounding
producers Shim Jae-myung (who is politically savvy in her own right)
and Shin Chul and executive producer Lee Eun who between them
developed trailblazing reputations for producing wild and successful
films such as Kim Jee-woon’s The Quiet Family (1998), Jang Sun-woo’s
Lies (2000), Kim Ki-duk’s The Isle (2000), Park Chan-wook’s Joint
Security Area (2000) and Kwak Jae-yong’s My Sassy Girl (2001). The
synergy running through Im’s project was built upon the energies of
these three variables as well as the talents of his production crew.
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Figure 1: Film posters courtesy of MK Pictures and Kino Video

Whereas the English subtitles on the 2005 censored DVD
version of The President's Last Bang say that it is based on a true story,
Im is quoted as saying that the story is his personal, truthful account of
the events of one night (Bertolin 2005). Those who have met or
interviewed Im soon gather that his understanding of this night in
question was derived from his own memories and thorough research of
the period. 10 Yet, if one digs deep, documents regarding the incident
abound. For instance, a minute-by-minute overview of the assassination
appears in English in the Korea Annual, 1980, which is published by
Hapdong News Agency, one of Korea’s longest-standing and largest
independent commercial news companies. This fascinating journal issue
presents a five-page discussion of the assassination as the number one
highlight of 1979, and a seventeen-page, mind-altering investigative
report, including the indictment against Kim Jae-gyu (KCIA Agency
Chief), the assassin of President Park who apparently was acting under
the illusion of obtaining political power, and the court-martial verdict
against all nine men involved. Minute details in the report, such as
10

The author thanks Im Sang-soo for sharing his personal thoughts and insights
during conversations held at Pusan International Film Festival #10 in October
2005 and during the Chungmuro International Film Festival in September 2008.
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descriptions of gloomy facial expressions, aspersions cast at the
President’s staff and verbatim quotes such as “I will finish him off
tonight”; “Your Excellency, do you think you can make good politics by
working with this worm-like guy?”; the President’s chief bodyguard
(Cha Ji-chol) is a “headache’’ and “When you hear gun shots in the room
(the restaurant), you eliminate the President’s bodyguards. Are you
ready?” partly made it Im’s script in waiting.

Figure 2: At about 6 minutes into the film, a doctor (played by Im
Sang-soo) advises KCIA Director Kim (played by Baek Yoon-sik) to
improve his health by resigning from Park Chung-hee’s brutal
regime. KCIA Agent Colonel Min (played by Kim Eung-soo) is
pictured screen-right holding a two-way radio. Permission to use all
still images from the film is granted by MK Pictures and SBS TV
Australia.

As a 386 Generation filmmaker – that is, someone who was in
their thirties during the 1990s (born in the 1960s) and enrolled in
university in the 1980s – Im has participated in the global promotion of
the Korean cinema by telling provocative stories that transcend national
and cultural borders. Being part of this generation is significant to this
overall picture because it is Im’s age group that formed the head, legs
and voice of the pro-democracy movement to end Korea’s military
dictatorship. Filmmakers under this label trained at international and
domestic film schools and have drawn upon their first-hand experience
of witnessing and living-through one of Korea’s most radical periods,
which includes the Kwang-ju massacre, student demonstrations, other
intensive protests organized before world media at the 1988 Seoul
Olympics, the end of the military regime and the subsequent victorious
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rise of democracy.11 In the 1980s Im was a Sociology major at Yonsei
University, which was a center for the student movement at that time.
Hence, he has experienced and lived through social, political and
cultural burdens and learned how to combat censorship after 1996, in an
era when few could imagine that restrictions of freedom of expression
still existed. One could say that Im’s generation has provided the
backbone for the Korean cinema’s rise to local, regional and
international fame – all while making films before and after censorship
was found to be unconstitutional. Each filmmaker in their own way has
reflected on Korea’s modern history – a history about surviving
prolonged dictatorship, rapid industrialization and economic crisis.
Although Korean filmmakers have practised their trade under these
challenging constraints for nearly half a century, it has been the 386
Generation filmmakers who have come of age by experiencing firsthand the lifting of rigorous state censorship in the mid-1990s.
The President's Last Bang imagines what authoritarian President
Park Chung-hee’s last night on earth (26 October 1979) was like before
the director of Korea’s Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) assassinated
him at close range with a West German-made 32 caliber gun. At the
same time, the narrative encompasses more than a single night in Park’s
life. The film surreptitiously portrays the 18-year gamut of his
dictatorship by implication, depicting the one night when the
assassination took place as a template for understanding and critiquing
this man who was and still is revered by his country. Scenes in which his
political opponents were imprisoned and tortured, and socialists or
liberalists were unjustly accused of being North Korean spies serve as
acute reminders of what occurred during Park’s reign. By the same token,
we see Park’s sexual inclinations and indulgences, which are
exemplified by the portrayal of women in the scene from Figure 3. We
are also exposed to unwavering views of Park’s coercive ideals and
policies as a means to facilitate patriotism (seen in Figure 4, his proJapanese disposition (he was an officer in the Japanese army during the
Japanese colonial period), and finally his fascist ideology regarding
11

Im’s filmography, which confronts contemporary issues of sexuality,
infidelity, youth street life and political history includes Girls' Night Out (1998),
Tears (2000), A Good Lawyer's Wife (2003) and The Old Garden (2006).His
portfolio demonstrates that he has always been interested in probing deeply into
the thorny issues of Korea’s transformative past. Investigating Korea’s breaking
family system and looking at the 1980 Kwang-ju Massacre from a distance
have been part of his Modus operandi.
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atomic armament and Korea’s overall relationship with the US
government. Perhaps for those who hold only high, endearing views of
Park and his Presidency, these strong views are somewhat painful to bear,
thus making Im’s film one of the first to broach this ‘taboo’ subject.

Figure 3: Topless girls swimming in President Park Chung-hee’s pool
on the day of his assassination. This scene proceeds the black screen
time where the documentary footage was deleted from the film’s 2005
version. Permission by MK Pictures and SBS TV Australia.

Figure 4: KCIA Chief Agent Ju (played by Han Seok-kyu) appearing in
the doorway of the KCIA’s torture chambers while democracy
advocates are being brutalized and humiliated. Permission by MK
Pictures and SBS TV Australia.

Fluid cinematography brings the audience on an intense journey
as KCIA Chief Kim decides that ‘tonight is the night’ to kill the
president – in the name of ‘democracy’. We follow KCIA Chief Agent
Ju and KCIA Agent Colonel Min as they collude to kill the President at a
private dinner banquet. A fierce, bloody gun battle ensues between
President Park’s bodyguards and KCIA agents after KCIA Director Kim
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shoots the President, splattering his blood at the banquet dinner table.
The positioning of the characters in Figures 5 and 6 below represents the
intensity of the event. The result is chaos among Park’s military ranks as
they jockey for position and attempt to maintain civil order. The film
offers a fleeting but intriguing and undoubtedly satirical perspective of
Park Chung-hee, who remains nameless throughout the film or is simply
referred to as the highly respectable one (gakha).

Figure 5: KCIA Director Kim shooting the President's Chief
Bodyguard Cha (for the second time) after the initial shooting of he
and President Park. Permission by MK Pictures and SBS TV
Australia.

Figure 6: In a final fit of madness, KCIA Director Kim gathers the
guts to shoot the President at close range. Permission by MK
Pictures and SBS TV Australia.

On 31 January 2005, only three days before the film’s scheduled
public release in Korea, the Seoul Central Court mandated that parts of
the film be cut. This move was prompted by litigation filed by the son of
the late President Park, Park Ji-man, who was using this official channel
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as a mode of attack. He sought to get the film banned. Im was familiar
with censorship in Korea because in 1998 his Girls' Night Out film was
re-edited under duress in order to conform to suggestions made by the
Performance Ethics Board. Yet, nothing could have prepared him for the
blame and harsh criticism that was directed at The President's Last
Bang. The Korean daily newspaper Donga-A Ilbo reported that Park Jiman argued the opening and closing credits’ inclusion of stills and
footage of actual protest marches and of his father’s funeral ceremony
blurred the boundaries between fact and fiction (Cho 2005). For the
beginning scene, Im used archival footage of outraged Korean students
and citizens in Pusan and Masan holding violent demonstrations in 1979
against President Park’s regime, demanding democratization. These prodemocracy protests in which military tanks overpowered the crowds
were staged about two weeks before Park’s death. Archival footage at
the end shows some of the same people who had protested against the
dictatorship shedding tears in the streets in the center of Seoul during the
grand funeral for President Park. Regardless of age and sex, people
mourned bitterly in this footage. These two radically different views
reflect on Park’s existence in dynamic ways, offering holistic insights
into the story and the film. Simply put, the film was feared as a
disturbance to the privacy of the Park family. Park’s legal threats aimed
explicitly at suppressing the film and discrediting its contents, while
implicitly attempting to damage and devalue Im’s reputation, as if Im
were committing some type of crime against the nation.
After all, President Park is considered by many to be the father
of Korea and the one responsible for industrializing Korea and bringing
it out of poverty. Under his regime, conglomerates such as Samsung,
Hyundai and LG grew beyond imagination, becoming among some the
world leaders in their fields. With Park’s support, small newspapers have
become media conglomerates. An upper-middle class was born under his
regime as well. With this in mind, the people behind these companies
and organizations are the same people who essentially run Korea today.
Hence, it is understandable that these people are against seeing a film
dealing with the darker side of Park and his assassination. This is
precisely why the film’s subject matter ranks as highly taboo. This is
also why Korea’s largest distributor, CJ Entertainment – a sister
company of Samsung – eventually refused to distribute Im’s film,
withdrawing its investment at the last minute. For Im, after so many
years since Park’s death, it is difficult to find a rational linkage between
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the decisions made by CJ and the thinking behind the others who
attacked the film and the thinking of the people in the historical footage.
According to Jansen and Martin (2004) and Gray and Martin
(2006), in defamation and censorship struggles there are several methods
and counter-methods employed by attackers and opponents respectively.
Five commonly-recurring methods used to block outrage against
oppression, that is, to prevent backfire against censorship are: 1) to
cover-up the events; 2) to devalue the target; 3) to reinterpret the story
and/or facts; 4) to appear to be seeking justice through official channels
and procedures; and 5) to intimidate. Conversely, then, for opponents,
exacerbating outrage against oppression and increasing backfire, that is,
decreasing the efforts of the attacker include: 1) to promote exposure to
and publicity of the event/case; 2) to legitimize the status or stature of
the attacked; 3) to offer a different interpretation to the story and/or
facts; 4) to utilize unofficial channels to expose the injustice of the
attack; and 5) to simply stand up against the coercion. Backfire, as the
term suggests, happens when a censorship case and its subsequent
publicity and/or exposure unexpectedly increases awareness of the event
and public support for the attacked as opposed to blocking the event
from public view (Jansen and Martin 2003).
Park Ji-man’s legal action attempted to use the law to
simultaneously gag The President's Last Bang and to discredit its
potentially defaming and libellous script, that is, to direct blame against
the film for showing contempt against the Park family. Although the
Court believed the film to be a fictional spoof that audiences would
interpret as a story based on false events, Park Ji-man was successful, at
least initially, in getting the film censored. As a result of the Court’s
decision, Im and producer MK Pictures were left with two options: 1) to
please the court and cut scenes from the film, or 2) to ignore the court
order and pay $30,000 USD in fines for each time the pre-censored
version of the film was commercially screened in cinemas or on TV,
which potentially could lead to the prevention of all future public
screenings of the film in Korea. The filmmaker acquiesced to the first
option and deleted scenes with documentary footage. However, he
launched a counter anti-censorship promotional strategy, which is
discussed below.
Draconian and politically-motivated disapproval of the film
surfaced in an era of supposedly newfound freedom of expression. On
the one hand, Im Sang-soo’s deconstruction of President Park’s mythical
aura was perceived as being too audacious and downright dishonoring
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given the high profile that Park’s daughter Park Geun-hye occupied as
chairwoman of the centre-right opposition party in Korea at the time. Yet,
on the other hand, controversy was fuelled by what was snipped from
the film; Im was ordered to delete nearly four minutes of documentary
footage because of Park Ji-man’s litigation. Hence, the film’s narrative
created hullabaloo on all sides of the picture. The English title did use a
risqué double-entendre use of ‘bang’ to mean sexual intercourse and
opening scenes of bikini-clad women exposing their supple breasts did
set a perverse scene for the President’s domicile. And, call girls lined up
(with their mothers) to give President Park – in the words of one of the
characters – ‘what he wanted’ and ‘what made him happy’. Moreover,
the film’s excessive portrayal of guns, violence, vulgar language and the
gory splattering of the President’s blood was used to depict a dirty old
man who had students, democracy leaders and other alleged communist
sympathizers humiliated and brutalized in the KCIA torture chambers
(as represented above in Figure 4). There is no mistake that the film
ventured in provocative and uncharted ‘taboo’ waters – with Im’s full
knowledge of what he was doing. However, a maturing democracy in a
developed country that has eliminated censorship is supposed to nurture
such ventures, or at least one might think a society of this statute would
have the confidence, endurance and reflexive skills to face critical albeit
painful views of its recent history.
Upon hearing news of the Court’s decision, members of the
Korean Motion Picture Association (KMPA) and Director’s CUT (a
young directors group) exposed what happened. They expressed outrage
at multiple press conferences that they organized on behalf of Im and the
film industry, and published articles on Pressian.com, a political news
website based in Seoul. The Court’s decision was interpreted as nothing
more than a brutal suppression of freedom of expression (Kim 2005).
From the view of the filmmakers, this type of draconian reaction was a
setback for creativity and a limitation on the democratic expression of
opinions and ideas. After 1996 film censorship had been considered as a
thing of Korea’s past semi-democratic and authoritarian governments.
Despite being hacked, Im’s visually stunning film was invited as an
official selection to the Cannes, New York, Toronto and Telluride film
festivals. Im resisted Park’s legal intimidation by using his Q & A
sessions, media interviews and general social interactions with nonKoreans to protest against the censorship of his film. He also received
support from festival authorities for his film, and used these situations
strategically and opportunistically to expand his protest campaign. A
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crucial technique was keeping black screen time in the film where the
deleted scenes initially would have appeared. This alone served as a
vivid reminder of what was going on and a signifier of the censorship. In
itself the black screen time and what it represents speaks louder than any
documentary footage could have, promoting the film and its self-styled
taboo script in unimaginable ways. The backlash was intensified in print
and by word-of-mouth across the globe by reporters, critics, academics,
industry people and cinephiles who homed in on the international
declaration of protest symbolized by the black screen time. News stories,
interviews and reviews divulged details about the censorship case,
fuelling Im Sang-soo’s reputation as some kind of cine-agent
provocateur, and furthering Im’s recognition beyond that of a lowbudget filmmaker who makes films about sexy women and frustrated
youth. He is one of the New Korean Cinema’s maverick filmmakers. In
this sense maybe the film’s censorship backfired because Im’s methods
were more effective than the Court’s.
At first glance, the use of black screen time with explanatory
subtitles, as well as Im’s protest before international audiences, made the
censorship, that is, the suppression of his politically-charged film,
backfire. Yet, viewed from another angle, while Im’s international
reputation has grown with the creation and release of The President's
Last Bang, which is a good thing, the censorship did not really backfire
– at least in terms of the film’s popularity. The film failed to make it into
the top ten grossing domestic Korean films in 2005. 12 Its national
audience reached a little over one million (1,083,962), which may seem
large for domestic films in some countries such as Australia and Taiwan
that face ongoing difficulties competing with Hollywood films – or even
a less popular Korean film overshadowed by one of the top five grossing
Korean blockbusters in a recent year. In other words, The President's
Last Bang was far from the commercial behemoths of the cheonman
younghwa or 10-million audience picture in the same era as The Host
(2006) and King and the Clown (2005) as well as Taegukgi (2004) and
Silmido (2003). At an estimated budget of $4.5 million USD, it was
never meant to be a blockbuster. Nevertheless, it was meant to reach
12

In 2005, according to Korean Cinema 2005, the top five domestic films based
on admissions in Seoul were: Welcome to Dongmakgol, MARATHON, Marrying
The Mafia, Sympathy For Lady Vengeance, and Another Public Enemy (a.k.a.
Public Enemy 2). In particular, the mainstream films MARATHON and Another
Public Enemy competed heavily with The President's Last Bang because both
films had been released in the week before it and both had gained wide appeal.
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people, but given its promotion and advertising budget, it fell short of its
target.
Without question, The President's Last Bang attracted a smaller
audience during the Lunar New Year holiday season than expected (in
Korea and overseas), though the sensation surrounding its court order
and its dark portrayal of Park Chung-hee made it relatively infamous at
home. Low box office takings specifically resulted from it screening on
a small number of screens in cinemas with a small number of seats –
mostly thanks to CJ’s abrupt withdrawal as the film’s distributor. The
film was released on about 190 screens with 31,000 seats, that is, half as
many screens as the top five domestic films released in the same year. In
other words, the film’s per-screen average was not very good. By
comparison, Another Public Enemy opened on 370 screens (with 85,000
seats) and MARATHON on roughly 300 screens (with 66,000 seats).
Moreover, the film failed to attract large numbers of Twenty-somethings
and Thirty-somethings, Korea’s biggest cinemagoing target audience.
People in this age bracket simply had no desire to see the film.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that they could not identify with the story
nor understand why President Park was assassinated to begin with.
After the ruling, the film’s producers, MK Pictures, immediately
appealed against the Court’s decision. In August 2006 they were
successful in overturning the censorship decision. The deleted
documentary footage was restored, but MK Pictures was forced to pay
Park Ji-man about $106,000 USD for slandering his father’s character
(Paquet 2006). Although harm to the film had already been done, Im and
MK Pictures continued to stand up for their right to make a film that
expressed different opinions and ideas. They stood for the principle
behind freedom of expression. In any case, the punitive damage was
hardly comparable to the hurdle producers had to overcome in January
2005 when their co-distributor, CJ Entertainment – one of the largest
vertically-integrated investors and controllers of domestic and
international film distribution in Korea – withdrew its distribution
commitments through its distribution channel CGV and venture capital
amounting to about 20 per cent of the film’s total budget. Ramifications
surrounding the film and its court case evidently spooked CJ
Entertainment, thus resulting in the company’s apparent failure to resist
the intimidation – even though Im was willing to stand up against the
suppression of freedom of speech. This was a mighty blow for the
attacked and a huge coup for the attacker because collective resistance,
which is usually more effective than an individual’s efforts, was deterred.
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Once more, Kino Video/Kino International based in New York,
the company that holds the North American distribution rights to the
film, has yet to release or see the need to carry the restored version of
the film. Apparently something was lost in translation when the previous
damaged (cut) version of the film was presented to audiences in North
America. Video sales and theatrical releases failed to live up to
expectations, and Kino has yet to make a return on its investment in the
film. So in this sense, perhaps the censorship case didn’t backfire.
Finally, in mid-2008 the film was restored to its original version and rereleased. It will be interesting to see how well the film sells.
It may be that not everyone – especially right wing individuals
who still worship Park – realizes that this is an intensely personal film
for Im, who makes it clear in interviews that he had no intention to
blame Park in the film. Rather, Im is one of the first 386 Generation
filmmakers to invite audiences to stand back and to reexamine overt
mythological views about Park – the man and not the precious myth.
The film tests how much the public has overcome these accustomed
views and whether or not Koreans have overcome their mourning for
Park. Nearly thirty years later, in the mid-to-late 2000s, the fascism of
Park and his entourage is meant to appear ridiculous as the protective
layers of reverence are peeled away. The images in Figures 7, 8 and 9
below portray this degree of absurdity rather well. Another (David
Lynch-type) scene that comes to mind is when President's Chief
Bodyguard Cha (while hiding in the President’s bathroom) desperately
attempts to re-attach a finger to his hand after KCIA Director Kim
shoots it off. Given the discussion presented here, I believe that it is
precisely this exposing the rawness that is why Koreans felt so
uncomfortable with this film. Scores of nameless right wing supporters
who still worship Park were enraged while surprisingly so many others
on the left who disdain Park remained silent – perhaps not really
knowing how to react to or to comment on the film’s critical perspective.
Only about 2% of the population wholly embraced this bold film by
paying to see it at a public cinema.
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Figure 7: President's Chief Bodyguard Cha (pictured in the
background in his underpants speaking to President Park on the
phone) and the President's Chief Secretary Yang (in the
foreground picking his nose) getting ready for President Park’s
last dinner. Permission by MK Pictures and SBS TV Australia.

Figure 8: KCIA Director Kim in the bathroom after excusing
himself from the dinner table. Permission by MK Pictures and
SBS TV Australia.

Figure 9: Top administrators and military officials in President
Park’s government saluting his lifeless body near the end of the
film. Note the placement of a military cap on the President’s
private parts. Permission by MK Pictures and SBS TV Australia.
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Tactic

Attackers (Park Jiman/Seoul Court)

Coverup/exposure

Blocked the film’s
exhibition by suing for
defamation and libel.
Attempted to cover-up the
case and maintain distance
between his politician
sister and the case.

Devaluing vs.
validating the
target

Interpretations

Use of channels

Focused on libellous
nature of Im’s version of
story. Devalued Im and
film content by suggesting
the film was highly
fictitious.

Claimed that documentary
footage of funeral and
protest marches blurred the
boundary between fact and
fiction.
Used Courts to lodge
defamation suit and to
apply pressure on CJ
Entertainment – the film’s
financial backer and
distributor.
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Opponents (Im Sang-soo,
MK Pictures and film
critics)
Publicized information
concerning the case in
local newspapers and
through interviews with
international film trade
journalists.
Internationalized the
struggle by exposing case
details at the Cannes Film
Festival, where The
President's Last Bang was
screened.
Used black screen time in
the film and explanations
in subtitles as a vivid
signifier for the censored
material.
Re-valued/reaffirmed
narrative content by
indicating the film was
based on thorough
research.
Film critics refer to Im as a
high-quality, artistic and
provocative filmmaker.
Focused on how freedom
of speech was being
suppressed after film
censorship was thought to
have been abolished.
Used Courts to lodge
appeal.
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Intimidation/resi
stance
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Park brings Im and the
film to court.

Im and the producers (as
well as exhibitors and film
festivals) resist by
screening the film – albeit
on a less than satisfactory
number of screens.

Korean Cinema Struggles
Although the intimidation did not work against Im per se, the bulldozing
litigation directly impacted on the film’s local and international
distribution, thus effectively hindering the film’s global popularity and
overall profitability. The point here is not to overstate the film's lack of
success because according to statistics available on the Korean Film
Council’s web site (www.kofic.or.kr), to date The President's Last Bang
is one of Im's most successful films by admissions with 338,025 in
Seoul and 1,083,962 nationally. By comparison, nationally The Old
Garden sold about 300,000 tickets and The Good Lawyer's Wife sold
1,750,000, while in Seoul only Tears sold nearly 25,000 and Girls' Night
Out reached 290,502 admissions. Nevertheless, there is no easy way to
tell how much more successful the film might have been if the legal
attack had never occurred. There may have been other things going on
that can help explain or at least contribute to the film’s (poor) reception
by audiences at home and abroad. Without further questioning the film’s
success or lack thereof, readers can decide for themselves if backfire
actually occurred and/or imagine how things might have been different.
Hopefully, this article will invite readers to take a closer look at the case
and to re-scrutinize its significance in larger discussions about the
oppression of freedom of expression.
There are many hurdles the film industry has to overcome in
order to continue achieving domestic and international accolades.
Challenges facing Korea’s film industry, such as a different mode of
censorship struggles raise difficult questions that must be answered
before another decade of growth can be achieved. This time and these
issues are pivotal, because they will dictate the future direction of the
whole of the Korean film industry. Will the film industry continue to
become more like Hollywood with its long-term and glorious history, or
will the Korean cinema fade into the ranks of other popular national
cinemas, joining the likes of Japan (1960s), Hong Kong (1970s) and
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China (1980s)? I don’t profess to have all the answers, however, it is
clear that filmmakers, activists, policy-makers and scholars are
attempting to gain a better understanding about this era as part of a
larger continuum of problems worth solving together. This is the kind of
fighting spirit that has contributed to the backbone of the New Korean
Cinema.
All censorship is political, and all lines drawn by censorship
regulators are moral lines drawn in the sand. That is, they are arbitrary
and based on attitudes and values of a particular social, political and
cultural milieu that change with time. Im is an agent of change as in the
case of those of his peers who have also challenged the Ratings Board
and the ratings system, surviving the intense censureship (blame and
disapproval), controversy, lawsuits, verbal attacks and threats
surrounding their films. As the author of the screenplay, and as in the
case of so many highly regarded films in the contemporary Korean
cinema released during its latest rise, Im vehemently stands by the way
he brought the research material to life. The five films that Im has
directed to date are ‘local’ in that they are linked to Korea’s modern
social history. Nevertheless, his films like so many others belonging to
his 386 Generation peers, such as Lee Chang-dong, Park Chan-wook,
Kim Jee-woon, Hong Sang-soo and Kim Ki-duk, to name a few, have
been regarded well outside of Korea, especially in France.13 In fact, one
of the hallmarks of the Golden Age that has just passed is the critique of
the human condition and the exploration of psychological circumstances
in Korean stories, which carry a universal appeal. Undoubtedly, Im
makes films that he personally finds interesting, and The President’s
Last Bang shows producers and audiences all over the world that he is a
director who is able to make big-budget films in addition to low-budget
films about women, for which Im feels he is known. In similar ways to
his contemporaries, Im has begun concentrating on international projects
and has no immediate plan to return to Korea to make films. In this
regard, he is someone who has escaped from Korea, deciding to remain
in exile.
As this article has attempted to show, a residual form of
oppression exists in Korea, and it has undoubtedly detracted some of the
limelight surrounding Korea’s domestic and export screen production
industries. All of the challenges mentioned above are significant for
13

At the time of writing, Im was in Paris, preparing for his next project
tentatively titled A Good Woman in Paris – a Korea-France co-production.
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different reasons. Yet, censureship as in the case of censorship is
important for larger social, cultural and political reasons because it is
seen as one of the most significant hurdles for other film industries
around the world to overcome – particularly as international coproductions and collaborations take center stage and analogue industries
jockey for position in new digital realms. At the time of writing,
countries such as Australia, France, Korea and the US (and possibly
India and Britain) are attempting to forge new co-production
opportunities through formal treaty agreements with China – where
existing censorship regulations deeply impact on the likelihood of
domestic films (including co-productions) being made and foreign films
being rated (under the single rating system) and shown at cinemas.
Thinking about censorship in this global sense in which different
cultures are converging is an exciting, but delicate matter, one in which
it is hoped that we will continue to maintain an open dialogue. The
dialogue has already begun in Korea where in late 2008 the
Constitutional Court has decided that the limited screening rating for
films with ‘objectionable’ content is now unconstitutional. Audiences
can decide for themselves if they wish to see a film with such content,
providing there is ample advanced warning about obscenity and violence.
Perhaps by opening up this can of worms other non-Hollywood film
industries can learn something from the Korean case; reflecting on one’s
own society in a critical and satirical way may be somewhat painful, but
it is part of a larger process of cultural maturity and understanding.
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